Niger’s military junta has taken bold steps to distance itself from France, particularly in the uranium mining sector, marking a significant shift in the country’s economic and diplomatic landscape. This move comes after the junta’s coup in July 2023, which ousted France’s ally, President Mohamed Bazoum. One of the most notable developments is the junta’s assumption of operational control over Somaïr, a uranium mining firm previously run by the French state-owned nuclear company, Orano.
Orano has struggled to resume exports from its Somaïr mine, as the junta has imposed roadblocks, leading to a financial crisis for the company. While Niger’s contribution to global uranium production is less than 5%, the country plays a crucial role in the European market, supplying a quarter of the uranium used in European nuclear power plants in 2022. The timing of this disruption is particularly problematic for Europe as it strives to reduce carbon emissions through nuclear power while facing broader energy challenges.
For France, the situation is politically and economically awkward. The potential exit of Orano from Niger could have significant ramifications for the country’s energy supply. France, which generates 65% of its electricity through nuclear power, is heavily reliant on uranium imports. In recent years, almost a fifth of France’s uranium has come from Niger, with Kazakhstan being the only other major supplier. The loss of Niger’s uranium would force France to seek alternative sources, such as those in Uzbekistan, Australia, and Namibia, though this could create logistical and geopolitical difficulties.
The longer-term implications of this shift could also affect the European Union (EU), which would likely turn to other uranium suppliers to meet demand. However, this could lead to uncomfortable consequences, as the EU would increase its reliance on Russia, a major supplier, despite sanctions on Moscow following its invasion of Ukraine. Russia has become a close partner to Niger’s junta, further complicating the geopolitical landscape.
The junta’s actions are not limited to economic consequences. They also signal a broader shift away from Western alliances. Niger’s military leaders have sought new partnerships with countries such as Iran, with talks about potential uranium deals gaining traction. This pivot to non-Western alliances is part of a broader trend in West Africa, where the military juntas in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali have increasingly turned to Russia for support, both militarily and diplomatically.
The relationship between the junta and France has been tense, particularly following the coup. President Macron’s outspoken condemnation of the coup and France’s support for ECOWAS, the West African regional bloc that initially considered military intervention to restore Bazoum to power, exacerbated the situation. France’s continued influence in the uranium sector had long been a source of resentment among many in Niger, who viewed it as a symbol of ongoing post-colonial dominance.
Orano, which had initially attempted to remain neutral and continue operations, has faced continuous roadblocks. The junta’s refusal to allow the usual export routes to resume has led to a severe buildup of uranium stocks in Somaïr, with millions of dollars’ worth of concentrate left unexported. In addition to this, the junta recently canceled Orano’s rights to develop a new uranium mine at the Imouraren deposit, a key project that had been expected to drive future growth in Niger’s uranium industry.
With the ongoing political standoff, the situation has become increasingly dire. Orano’s production halt, coupled with a blockade of uranium exports, has compounded the strain on Niger’s economy, which relies heavily on these resources. Despite these challenges, the junta appears unfazed, supported by a rise in oil exports thanks to a new Chinese-built pipeline. This financial boost appears to give the regime the confidence to withstand the economic consequences of severing ties with Orano and France.
The broader impact of this standoff will be felt in Niger’s uranium-producing regions, like Arlit, where the mining industry is a major economic driver. While there are talks of potential new players, including Chinese interests, taking over some mining operations, the disruption caused by the blockade and loss of French investment could still have a lasting negative effect on the local economy. However, Niger’s junta is focused on reducing its dependence on traditional Western partners, including France, and appears willing to endure the costs of reorienting its economic alliances.
The long-term future of Niger’s uranium industry remains uncertain. While alternative sources of uranium may be available, the shifting geopolitical alliances and the country’s growing ties with Russia and China could reshape not only Niger’s mining sector but also its place in the broader global energy landscape.
